One more in my backyard? Insights from the 2011 Italian nuclear referendum by Pignataro, Giuseppe & Prarolo, Giovanni
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
One more in my backyard? 
Insights from the 2011 Italian 
nuclear referendum 
 
 
 
 
Giuseppe Pignataro 
Giovanni Prarolo 
 
 
Quaderni  - Working Paper DSE N° 837  
  
  
 
1 
 
 
One more in my backyard? Insights from the  
2011 Italian nuclear referendum1 
 
Giuseppe Pignataro2 and Giovanni Prarolo3 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the 2011 Italian referendum on nuclear power as a clean laboratory 
for recovering information on the spatial pattern of votes about the construction (or 
restoration) of nuclear facilities. Our results show that voting preferences on building 
nuclear facilities are sensible to proximity determined by a strong local component. Voters’ 
opposition to nuclear installments tends to be even higher when the effect of both existing 
and proposed plants is taken into account. The study tracks the changes of risk perception 
and voting preferences finding a positive correlation between the distance-related 
perceived nuclear risk and the share of participation against nuclear power. The perceived 
risk and the consequent voting pattern are even higher in communities close to proposed 
nuclear plants compared to the existing ones. This holds even after taking into account local, 
regional and political features and several municipality characteristics which may influence 
preferences over nuclear power. 
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1. Introduction 
On November 1987, Italy held its first national referendum to decide whether to shut down its nuclear 
power plants. Italian voters approved a proposal which would have been forced closure of the four 
nuclear power plants erected in Caorso, Trino Vercellese, Latina and Garigliano. Two decades later, in 
2008, Italian government announced its intentions to reactivate the four dormant reactors and to raise 
other ten by 2013 to reduce its dependence on imported energy. Soon after, a second referendum 
(held on the 12-13 June 2011) has swept away this possibility confirming an indefinite ban on the 
nuclear energy option. This last initiative was in large part a consequence of intense public outcry 
concerning the future of nuclear electrical generations in Italy4. 
The revealed preferences approach may in principle provide information on expected benefits or costs 
in the same way as proposed in the traditional market setting for consumption (Deacon and Shapiro, 
1975; Rushton, 2005). Outcomes originated by referenda have proven to be informative about 
economic behavior, in particular responses of the ballot generally reflect a process of individuals’ 
welfare maximization in the comparison between expected benefits and carried costs of the proposal 
(Casella and Gelman, 2008; Kent et al., 2010).  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the electoral voting process manifested on the 2011 Italian 
nuclear referendum. Voting models tend to presume that each community is rather narrowly self-
interested regardless of the collective benefit that building new facilities can determine at the national 
level. In the special case of nuclear issue, an additional determinant of voting outcomes concerns the 
opposition to facilities perceived as risky. Research on nuclear attitudes focused on proximity as the 
leading cause of resistance to hazardous facilities (among others Stoffle et al., 1991; Pancs and Vriend, 
2007). The general message is that communities in close proximity are brought together in the 
opposition of new plants although they put aside their differences in beliefs and values in voting 
choice.  
To extend this analysis, we therefore introduce a new measure of distance that takes into account both 
the existence of nuclear plants and the prospective construction of the new ones. It is defined as the 
difference between the minimum distance from all existing plants and the minimum distance from all 
proposed ones. It captures how much the perceived nuclear risk influences municipality’s choice if the 
referendum would not have success. Intuitively, it allows to recognize potential variations in risk 
related to different impact of distances between existing and proposed facilities. This indirectly 
implies that votes for and against the proposal may be affected by different risk perceptions of them. 
In particular evidence about proximity impact of both existing and proposed plants is highly robust 
although according to literature on risk communication (Levinson, 1999), perceived risk tends to be 
lower in communities close to existing nuclear plants, thus expecting reduced protests (in terms of 
votes) compared to communities close to proposed nuclear plants.  
Moreover the existing literature is quite supportive of the notion that perceived changes in own 
personal and social values hold a great deal of voting behavior. Several factors may influence voters’ 
choice providing information on the pros and cons for each community. Beyond proximity to nuclear 
facilities, we test several hypotheses regarding the sources of voting at municipality level, such as 
demographics, political leaning and other community attributes. In particular we model the 
                                                          
4The fear of a nuclear disaster appeared to be the public’s natural feeling especially in the aftermath of the 
grievous occurrence in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011. 
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municipality voting decision to depend on population characteristics like representativeness of 
employment categories, unemployment rate, education, share of foreigners, homeowners and elderly 
population among others. As we are going to see, the debate over nuclear power led by the political 
parties was one of the key issues that shaped the results of the referendum. This insight (as results 
suggest) involves political ideology and partisanship as possible contributors in favor (or against) the 
construction of the facility. 
According to the homevoter hypothesis, further, owners are more likely to vote in favor of certain 
facilities perceived to increase residential property value. In case of referendum on stadium subsidies 
Carlino and Coulson (2004) discover that the presence of a new stadium increases social benefits for a 
community. Hosting a professional sport franchise has a positive impact into property values (and this 
effect is even stronger in proximity to the facility) sufficient to justify subsidies with a rise in higher 
local taxation. Dehring et al. (2008) demonstrate that the effect of public announcements for the 
subsidization of the Dallas Stadium implies a reduction in the property values close to the stadium 
while increasing those that were far away. The authors motivate this result in the form of positive 
externalities (e.g., potential benefits due to new parking and concession) of having the stadium for 
those living further away and negative externalities (greater congestion and noise) of living close. 
Precincts with positive variations in price signals were thus more likely to vote for the initiative than if 
they lived close to the stadium. Analyzing data for 46 states, Hilber and Mayer (2009) establish that 
school district spending is higher in less developed area. They argue that an increase in the quality of 
education within districts with lower economic opportunity is directly capitalized in household prices 
to a greater extent than in area with higher potential development. Brunner et al. (2001) and Brunner 
and Sonstelie (2003) investigate voting behavior on school voucher observing that a support for 
school choice initiative is lower in area with good (public) school while is higher in precincts with poor 
ones. The motivation (even in this case) was guided by the perceptions that a higher subsidy for the 
voucher would have reduced the willingness to pay for household thus harming the property value of 
homeowners close to good public school. Furthermore, proximity to facility has been an issue on the 
appropriate extent and definition in cost-benefit analysis. Close in spirit to our paper is the idea 
proposed by Coates and Humphreys (2006) who explicitly take into account the role of proximity and 
its effect on support for a stadium proposal. In their case proximity have a positive influence on public 
attitudes although as expected stronger support is related by precincts near to a proposed site than 
from those close to the existing one. 
The general concern for nuclear power, however, involves particular considerations that should be 
taken into account. Much of the controversy appears to have been firmly grounded in the perceptions 
of health and safety risks to those proximate to the nuclear facility. In this case community preferences 
are definitively expressed with higher opposition by local residents closest to potentially hazardous 
sites. Moreover several studies have investigated the net effect of proximity to a nuclear power plants 
and a large part tends to interpret perceived risk as the most prominent factor in driving NIMBY (Not 
In My BackYard) sentiments. NIMBY concerns are generally understood to reflect resistance to 
potentially hazardous facilities by local communities. Proximity to facilities that are perceived to pose 
risk to local residents has been shown to generate opposition to such facilities (Benford et al., 1993). 
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) measure the detrimental effects of using price incentives in real-life 
issues (like the siting of locally unwanted projects) where individual’s sense of civic duty assumes 
heavily a crucial role. They conjecture on a democratic political process among individuals able to 
solve the NIMBY conflict under the achievement of a well-defined political equilibrium. Schively 
(2007) and Rabe et al. (2008) discover that the perceptions of the affected residents concerning the 
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risks posed by the site, trust for the groups involved, and acceptance of the process of site selection are 
some of the most important factors related to the NIMBY overreaction.  
From the standpoint of social theories in this field (see e.g., Wolsink, 1994; Fischer, 1995), people’s 
appreciation for the advantages derived from nuclear facilities (when they exist) is confirmed as long 
as it is not located near their place of residence. Kuhn (1998) for instance verifies a positive 
relationship between facility acceptability, risk perception, and distance from the place of residence 
among the supporters of a nuclear-fuel waste disposal plant in Canada. Lober and Green (1994) and 
Lober (1995) measure the aversion towards siting waste disposal plants. They discover that proximity 
to a proposed facility will affect support or opposition to it depending upon the type of facilities at 
issue and the perceived benefits and costs associated with them. Even in case different from nuclear 
power, the results are seemingly related. For instance Hampton (1996) measures the local resistance 
to the construction of a series of munitions’ depots (as high risk facilities) in Australia. He shows that, 
contrary to what expected, residents living in close proximity did not perceive higher risk of damage 
compared to the residents of other areas. In the case of waste incineration, Hunter and Leyden (1995) 
observe that NIMBY attitude is more related to anxiety for generic health consequences rather than to 
property values. Shen and Yu (1997) and Feinerman et al. (2004) realize that motivation of public 
opposition may reflect a rational response by the communities who perceive an imbalance between 
the benefits they will receive from hosting a plant (e.g., new recruitments and tax concession) and the 
costs they will bear such as lower property values and potential health and environmental risks or 
undefined moral values5. Frey et al. (1996) observe that an adequate balance of costs and benefits 
characterized by cycles of monetary compensation to be received by the communities can lead to a 
political process in order to win the support of host communities. As suggested by Hermansson (2007) 
when faced with an increase in risky prospects, the evaluation of the decision process and its related 
perception costs is contingent upon an actual harmful occurrence at later date and is not simply 
amenable to insurance schemes.  
The analysis in this paper sheds light on an interesting area of the local opposition relevant to 
measuring risk perception impact and idiosyncratic aversion on nuclear plants characterized by the 
strong negative correlation between share of voters (against the adoption of nuclear power) and the 
distance of municipalities. Specifically in our analysis a ‘localized’ effect is in place such that the 
construction of new facilities poses the nearby residents at largest risk, resulting in greater concern 
and opposition by those residents. Thus communities close to the plant reject even more the nuclear 
option because their expectations of localized losses outweigh the social prospects. The remarkable 
implication here is that this effect applies directly to proximity translating in an increase of the ballot 
at the referendum. 
Section 2 describes the institutional background on which the referendum took place. Section 3 
conceptualizes the measures of proximity applied in this context. Section 4 presents the data and 
section 5 collects the results. Conclusion follows in section 6. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 They conjecture on a democratic political process among individuals able to solve the NIMBY conflict under the 
achievement of a well-defined political equilibrium.    
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2. Institutional background 
Before turning to the empirical analysis about determinants of voting in the referendum, it is 
necessary to put it into normative perspective and to recall the context in which it was held in Italy. 
The so-called popular referendum (which is observed here) is one of the two forms of legally binding 
democratic devices provided for by the Italian Constitution (art. 75) to involve people’ choice into the 
public decision process. The alternative mechanism, i.e. the constitutional referendum (art. 138), can be 
only called in order to decide on whether to approve a constitutional law or amendment passed 
through both legislative Houses of the Italian Parliament with a majority of less than two thirds in both 
or either Chamber. It can be called only at the request of one fifth of the members of either House, or 
five regional councils, or 500,000 electors. 
The popular referendum can be proclaimed at the request of five regional councils or the collection of 
500,000 signatures of eligible voters signing a public validated petition and only in order to decide on 
whether to repeal an existing law. The law-repealing referendum requires a minimum threshold 
(quorum) of more than half the electorate to vote to be binding, see Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) for 
the impact of a participation quorum in the turnout rate.  
For what involves our analysis, balloting ended in a two-day referendum (on the 12-13 June 2011) in 
which almost 95% of Italian voters have rejected a law passed by government that aimed to restart 
Italy's nuclear energy plan stalled for more than 20 years. Note that, despite the striking result 
occurred among the voters, the strategy of those backing the implementation of nuclear power was to 
not show up at the ballot, so to miss the 50%+1 quorum needed for the referendum to be valid. It 
turned out that the referendum was valid, with a turnout of more than 56%. Historically, Italy’s 
nuclear industry was dismantled after votes in the referendum proposed in 1987. Plants that have 
been shut off at that date (but were still dormant in 2011, such that the political decision would have 
refurbished them), were Caorso, Trino Vercellese, Latina and Garigliano. The 1987 referenda votes 
against nuclear power also came in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine in 
1986.  
Afterwards a change in government policy in 2008 marked the beginning of plans for a program of 
nuclear construction to reduce the country's dependence on oil, gas and imported power. Note that 
restarting nuclear plants was one of the promises of Centre-Right government when it was elected in 
2008. Thus legislation was passed in the same year to guarantee the construction of nuclear power 
plants while economic agreements have been signed with energy companies to build at least four new 
nuclear plants beginning in 2013. The list of the new proposed locations incuded: Chioggia, 
Monfalcone, San Benedetto del Tronto, Mola di Bari, Scanzano Jonico, Palma di Montichiaro, Oristano, 
Borgo Sabotino, Termoli and Scarlino.  
The diffusion and circulation of the prospective nuclear sites comes from a circumstantial report 
brought out by the Italian Federation of the Greens during the months prior to the referendum. In few 
months fears about nuclear power have increased in the run-up to the referendum on June following 
the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant, caused by a tsunami the 11th of March 2011. In the wake 
of the Japanese disaster, it was not, therefore, startling that Italian citizens voted to throw the proposal 
out. Moreover at the time of referendum, the Japanese catastrophe has already forced German 
government into a U-turn on nuclear power. In particular, Germany’ choice to abandon nuclear energy 
over the next 11 years possibly might have influenced a profound impact on public opinion in Italy. 
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Thus, what was surprising for us was not simply the size of the majority (95%) or the relatively high 
turnout of more than 56%, one of the highest in any Italian referendum for over a decade, but rather 
the rise in the share of yes-voters in proximity to potential nuclear plants. On one side, referendum 
‘proponents’ referred in the popular media and electoral drive to widespread general support about 
the proposal along all Italian regions (independently by the distance from nuclear reactors) due to the 
necessity to form the quorum. On the other side, Government instead of fighting for the legislation on 
its merits, have tried to deter voters from participating plus an attempt to block the vote failed in the 
courts a few days before polling. 
It is worth noting that due to the incentives relied on nuclear power and its potential NIMBY impact on 
the distance of residents’ dwellings from the proposed sites, the same voters also rejected other, very 
different laws in three further referenda. Two of them dealt with water privatization. A third 
concerned a law allowing Prime Minister and his cabinet to avoid court appearances (immunity from 
trial) by citing government business as a reason. 
To the best of our knowledge this seems to be one of the few investigations on referenda case study at 
national level. We feel quite safe in assuming that after controlling for municipality attitudes, the only 
variable at play is proximity, since no structured and detailed compensation plans have been 
associated to the decision of building new nuclear plants. We test this by means of a Difference In 
Difference framework applied to transfers at municipality level (see Appendix A for the exercise). 
 
3. Municipal-level distances  
According to a cost-benefit analysis the spatial distribution of votes should reflect the spatial 
distribution of net costs that voters perceive from building or restoring plants at various distances 
from where they live. Nuclear energy could be interpreted as a nationwide good so the advantages 
exploited by consumers are independent of their distance from the facility, especially in Italy where 
the market for electricity allows for a unit cost that is virtually homogeneous within the Italian 
territory. However, two effects related to distance come in place. First, municipalities at all locations 
will be equally likely to vote in favor of abandoning the nuclear hypothesis but this effect is even 
higher since the perceived costs (in terms of risk) diminishes far away from the plant, thus those living 
near a facility will be more inclined to be against the nuclear proposal (i.e., voting yes at the 
referendum) than those living far away. Second, analogous reasoning can be applied to the spatial 
pattern of voting on a referendum by taking into account the different impacts (if there are) that 
existing and proposed plants may determine in voting preferences. Interpreting nuclear option as a 
public opportunity (ceteris paribus), municipalities living near existing plants and municipalities living 
near proposed ones will be equally likely to vote against the nuclear option. This is true because the 
presence of facility would confer identical disadvantages on all them. However municipalities living 
near proposed facilities will be more likely to vote against the proposal than those living near existing 
facilities. There are two reasons for this: first, voters near proposed facility are likely to have a high 
marginal disutility for the installation of new plant and second, (at least in the nuclear context we 
investigate) risk perception of the new proposed facilities seems to be an important factor in voters’ 
dislike while this effect is attenuated in case of existing facilities.  
Thus our main explanatory variable tries to capture some specific characteristics of the policy whose 
potential implementation would have been decided with the referendum. In particular, there are two 
features that differ with respect to the usual case of the location of a new facility as it is the case in 
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Schulze and Ursprung (2000), van der Horst (2007), Rushton (2005). First, we analyze the location of 
multiple plants and second, some (all in our case) of the existing plants have been reconfirmed as 
proposed facilities. This means that the four working (but not producing) nuclear plant would have 
been put again in production in case of failure of the referendum.  
We address the first issue by assuming that, if any, people's concern is only due to the closest nuclear 
plant, as a quick look at local newspapers shows. Moreover, we look at provinces that are in the 
vicinity of two (existing and proposed) nuclear facilities and construct for them the Google Index for 
the names of the municipalities in which the nuclear plants are (or would be).6 Suggestive evidence 
reported in Table 1 points to a situation in which the closest nuclear plant attracts more attention on 
the internet. In particular, with respect to existing plants the internet traffic related to close nuclear 
plants was overall scarce, with Milan province showing a higher Google Index for the Caorso nuclear 
plant, only marginally closer than Trino. For proposed nuclear plants the pattern of internet search is 
very clear: overall higher traffic and a clear polarization of traffic toward the closest plant. Based on 
this consideration and the suggestive evidence reported, we construct two types of municipality-level 
distance. These Euclidean distances are distold and distall, which refer to the minimal distance from 
existing and all (existing and prospective) plants, respectively.  
 
 
Table 1. Distance between provinces and nuclear plants and Google Index. Weighted Distance is the 
average distance from each municipality weighted by the size of electorate, while Capital Distance is that 
of the capital city of each province. 
 
                                                          
6 The Google Index (available through the Google Insights service, http://www.google.com/insights/search/), 
computed for each keyword referred to nuclear site location, reports on a 0-100 scale how the specific internet 
search was relevant in every Italian province. The Google Index is calculated for the period September 2010 - 
June 2011. 
EXISTING PLANTS Trino Vercellese Caorso 
 
weighted distance 
(capital distance) 
Google Index 
(Novara=100) 
weighted distance 
(capital distance) 
Google Index 
(Parma=100) 
Alessandria 45 (40) 0 100 (100) 0 
Como 95 (93) 0 101 (102 0 
Genova 104 (101) 0 102 (105) 0 
Milan 80 (78) 5 73 (64) 11 
Pavia 61 (69) 0 67 (58) 0 
PROPOSED PLANTS Chioggia Monfalcone 
 
Weighted Distance 
(Capital Distance) 
Google Index 
(Venezia=100) 
Weighted Distance 
(Capital Distance) 
Google Index 
(Gorizia=100) 
Pordenone 91 (87) 0 70 (70) 12 
Treviso 63 (50) 54 103 (101) 1 
Venezia 34 (24) 100 100 (101) 6 
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For what involves the co-existence of existing and proposed nuclear plants, we claim that 
municipalities should not react in the same way. Indeed, the literature stresses that risk is perceived 
more if the "risky object" is still not in place, while once it is constructed risk perception decreases. For 
this reason people living close to existing nuclear plants should not suffer a large increase in their 
perceived risk. In particular, if a new nuclear plant had to be built farther from their "reference" 
nuclear plant (i.e. the closest existing one), communities should not be affected at all.  
Figure 1 shows the concept with the help of a linear world in which there are two existing plants (O1 
and O2) and the proposed policy is to build a new plant (N1) and to keep old ones in operation. A and B 
are two municipalities, so distold (distall) is computed for each municipality as the minimal distance 
from the old (old and new) plants. Finally, we define our key variable, distdif, as the difference between 
distold and distall, which represents how much the nuclear risk approaches to each municipality after 
the policy is implemented. It is immediately clear that (i) for municipality A nothing changes, since its 
closest nuclear plant is still operative (O1 was working before and after the policy), (ii) for municipality 
B (and in this linear case for any municipality to the right of N1) distdif increases with the distance 
between the (closest) old and (closest) new plants, O2 and N1, respectively. Note that there is a large 
segment where distdif is equal to zero, in particular to the left of the midpoint between O2 and N1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Representation of distold, distall, and distdif in a linear world. O1  and O2 
are existing plants, N1 is the new plant and A and B are two municipalities.  
 
We relate this idea into the empirical analysis constructing distoldi=min{dij};where j={Caorso, Trino 
Vercellese, Latina, Garigliano} and distalli=min{dik;distoldi}; while k={Chioggia, Monfalcone, San 
Benedetto del Tronto, Mola di Bari, Scanzano Jonico, Palma di Montichiaro, Oristano, Borgo Sabotino, 
Scarlino, Termoli} where elements dij (dij) are the Euclidean distances in thousand kilometers between 
municipality i and each old (new) plant j (k). Figure 2 reports a map of Italy with new and existing 
nuclear plants, together with the distribution of difdist, where lighter (darker) shades of grey 
represent small (large) values. For many municipalities (48% of the sample) difdist takes value zero, in 
particular this is the case in the Northwestern part of Italy where there are two existing nuclear plant 
(Trino Vercellese and Caorso) and no further nuclear plants are prospected, together with the area 
north of Naples and South of Rome. Note that on the contrary Sicily and Sardinia experience large 
values of difdist because they do not host any nuclear plant while it was expected to realize one in each 
region if the referendum would have been unsuccessful. 
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Figure 2. Location of existing (squares) and proposed (circles) nuclear plants. 
Darker areas represent higher values of distdif 
 
 
4. Data and related variables 
We use municipality-level data about the referendum held on 12-13 June 2011 obtained from the 
Department of Internal Affairs. This information specifically include the size of the electorate (ELEC), 
the number of people that went to vote (VOTE) and the number of casted yes (YES) which indicates the 
option against nuclear power. With these variables we construct the turnout (turn=VOTE/ELEC), the 
share of yes among voters (yesv=YES/VOTE) and the share of yes among the electorate 
(yese=YES/ELEC=turn*yesv).  
Given the institutional features sketched in the relative section, we take yese as our main variable of 
interest. It is highly correlated with turn, while yesv should be uninformative about the real 
preferences of population with respect to the issue at stake in the referendum. Descriptive statistics 
for these three variables and the other variables used in the empirical analysis are collected in Table 2. 
As expected, the distribution of yese and turn are similar in terms of mean, standard deviation and 
extreme values, while yesv is particularly concentrated around its mean and left skewed. The 
correlation between yese and turn is 0.98, while yesv correlates only 0.36 and 0.15 with yese and turn, 
respectively, see Table 3. 
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Our main explanatory variable is distdif, extensively described above. Its distribution presents a mass 
in zero (48% of observations are zeroes), a mean of 73 kilometers and, given the large right skew, the 
median of distdif is less than 2 kilometers. Out of curiosity the municipality experiencing the largest 
approach of risk is Palma di Montechiaro (in Sicily), which before being selected as location of a new 
plant, had the closer existing nuclear plant at more than 450 kilometers.  
The other measures are distall and distold (already described in the discussion on the construction of 
distdif). Then, distnew defined as the minimal distance from the eight prospective nuclear plants and 
distfor which refers to the minimal distance from three nuclear plants in France and Switzerland that 
are close to the northern Italian border. Mean distall is smaller than that of distold, deriving from a 
prospected denser presence of nuclear plants. The potential increase in nuclear plants density would 
lead to have respectively more than 450 (5%) or 1900 (23%) of the overall municipalities within a 
distance of 25 or 50 kilometers from the closest nuclear plant.  
We introduce several variables that may have a role in explaining the municipality-level voting pattern 
and their description is in Table 2. Demographic variables, including elderly share, education 
attainment, homeownership rate and representativeness of ten working sectors among others, are 
obtained from 2001 census while (the log of) population in 2011 comes with referendum data. Data on 
electoral outcomes at 2008 political elections comes from Ministry of Interiors, while we constructed 
the Google Index at province level using "nucleare" as keyword and March-June 2011 as time-period. 
The expected and actual effects on referendum's outcomes of these variables will be analyzed, 
whenever meaningful, in the next section.  
Among the many pairwise correlations presented in Table 3, note the positive (negative) one between 
yese and distdif (distnew), as suggestive of our expected macro pattern. The correlations of turn with 
the same two variables show the same sign because of the large correlation existing between yese and 
turn. Moreover yese and turn are not surprisingly highly (negatively) correlated with polright, the vote 
share that the two main center-right parties obtained at 2008 political election. The center-right 
coalition indeed won the elections in 2008 and pushed for the quorum of the 2011 referendum not to 
be reached.  
 
5. Empirical evidence and comments  
We set up a linear regression model in which the dependent variable is, in large part of the analysis, 
yese while the main explanatory variable is distdif. A series of other explanatory variables is also 
included, together with a full set of regional fixed effects. All specifications are fitted by Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS, hereafter), with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Given the spatial nature of 
the data, one could think of adding some additional structure to the error term and/or to the 
dependent variable (i.e., a spatial lag model). The issue of spatial correlation of errors should be 
mitigated by the inclusion of a large set of controls and, if any, the estimated parameters should be a 
lower bound of the true ones. On the other hand, we would have problem of upward bias if we had to 
estimate by OLS a model with spatial lags in the dependent variable. Reassuringly, the dependent 
variable is not subject to diffusive effects since the voting period was only two days and local results 
were only knew after the ballots have been closed. Some remarks are worth presenting here, in 
particular the statistic absence of compensations for municipality in the vicinity of nuclear plants that 
would in principle offset the expected negative utility drop caused by proximity itself, see Appendix A 
for details. We claim also that distance-related risk perception that people "converted" in voting 
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behavior in the referendum has been strongly shaped by the Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 
2011, few months before the referendum in Italy. With this aim in mind, in Appendix B using 
comparable data from the 1987 Italian nuclear referendum, we show that the proximity to nuclear 
plants seems to be an issue only in 2011 referendum implying a distance-related gradient in voting 
pattern.  
The first specification is simply yese against a constant and distdif, the results being reported in column 
1 of Table 4. The coefficient on distdif implies that the share of yes-votes among the electors increases 
by 1% for every 100 km approaching the nuclear facilities. In column 2 when we include the full set of 
regional dummies (taking into account institutional and political characteristics such as the regional 
electoral cycle and the political orientation of regional administrations) the coefficient of distdif is 
more than double. Further we include all variables from the 2001 census and the log of resident 
population in 2011 (column 3). The point estimate of distdif reduces from the previous 0.22 to 0.18, 
with standard error 0.02, delivering a t-stat of 9.03 that confirms the strongly positive effect of the 
distance variable on voting behavior. In this case, 1% increase in votes against nuclear power (i.e. yes-
votes) is achieved every 60 kilometers approaching the closest nuclear plant. The share of elderly 
people has instead a negative coefficient, possibly reflecting a shorter time horizon of older cohorts 
and therefore their underestimation of long-run utility loss that the vicinity of a nuclear plant could 
imply through lower property value or health issues. Higher shares of commuters lead to higher yes 
votes and this seems to be a signal of higher environmental concerns in municipalities with higher 
income and wealth. This consideration could also be valid for the negative coefficient of 
unemployment. In terms of sectorial distribution of the working population, we spot that the presence 
of highly unionized sectors (public administration, manufacturing and education) is associated with 
higher percentage of yes-votes. Unions in Italy are by far closer to center-left positions, so at that time 
unions and center-left parties where at the opposition and a yes-vote was motivated (at least in part) 
by political reasons against the central government that sponsored the new nuclear policy.  
Further we expected positive coefficients for agriculture and hotel and restaurants but these variables 
turn out to be not significant. The positive coefficient on the share of healthy workers may possibly 
reflect the higher health-related concern these people have in living close to nuclear facilities. Finally, 
the positive coefficient on the share of workers in the energy sector could reflect either aversion to 
nuclear power stemming from competition between alternative ways of producing energy (i.e. gas or 
coal power plants could be shut off if new nuclear plants had to be constructed) or higher aware to 
health risk associated with nuclear energy.  
In the specification whose results are reported in column 4 we enclose two variables relative to 
political elections in 2008, polturn and polright. We consider the former as a measure of civic 
awareness (the aversion to nuclear power being part of this perception), close in spirit to the use of 
referenda turnout in social capital measurement, but more detailed since social capital indices are at 
provincial-level while polturn is at municipality-level. Its positive and highly significant coefficient 
confirms our expectations. polright is an indication of political leaning of the municipality toward 
right, so we expect it to be negatively correlated with yese. This is indeed the case while the coefficient 
is hugely significant, showing a t-stat above 56. Including these two variables, the adjusted R-squared 
increases by 0.23 (from 0.37 to 0.60) and some coefficients change their level of significance. For 
example homeownership, already positive, becomes strongly significant confirming the homevoter 
hypothesis that states that homeowners vote in favor of public projects they perceive increase 
residential property values and against those that do not, as stressed by Dehring et al. (2008). Also, 
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education becomes positive and significant, backing the hypothesis of higher environmental concerns 
among highly educated people. Population, previously positive and significant, now become 
insignificant and this can be explained by the negative correlation between center-right leaning and 
population. In column 5 we considers also the Google Index, intended to capture local awareness to 
nuclear power. The coefficient is positive and significant and, even if positively correlated as expected 
with difdist, the coefficient of difdist does not change much and remains strongly significant, as it is the 
case for all other significant coefficients.  
Column 6, our preferred specification, further adds the minimal distance from foreign power plants. Its 
coefficient is negative and significant, pointing at an "irrational" aversion to nuclear facilities being out 
of control by the Italian central government. The inclusion of distfor, positively correlated with distdif 
(since many municipalities with distdif equal to zero are those in the vicinity of French and Swiss 
power plant) makes the coefficient on distdif to increase until 0.12 (with robust standard error equal 
to 0.02). This implies that a 1% increase in votes against nuclear power is achieved every 85 
kilometers of approaching the closest nuclear plant. In columns 7 and 8 we show that using as 
dependent variable the turnout rate turn results are basically unchanged, while results for the share of 
yes among the voters, yesv, are very much driven by political ideology (polright is negative and 
significant) and not nuclear risk, since distdif is not significant. 
In order to spot possibly novel patterns in voting behavior, we now observe what happens in the 
vicinity of old and prospective nuclear plants separately. As suggested by the literature of risk 
perception when the experience of risk has, or has not, already taken place, the voting pattern could be 
in principle different (Cremer et al., 1997). In Column 1 of Table 5 our variable of interest is a dummy 
flagging those municipalities within a radius of 10 kilometers and the null coefficient suggests that a 
differential voting pattern around existing nuclear plants cannot be spot. This could be however a 
mere small sample issue, since only 35 municipalities satisfy the criterion. Augmenting the radius to 
30 kilometers (Column 2) the number of municipalities becomes 352 and the coefficient on this 
variable is surprisingly negative and significant, in line with van der Horst (2007) that stresses how 
new and unfamiliar facilities attract more opposition and that experiencing facilities lowers the 
perceived risk associated with the facilities themselves. In line with this reasoning, we find that when 
we look at municipalities in the vicinity of prospective nuclear plants (10 and 30 kilometers, results in 
Columns 3 and 4, respectively) results revert, i.e., people are more like to vote against nuclear power 
(between 1% and 3.5%), precisely because of inexperienced risk. Columns 5 and 6 replicate without 
discriminating between old and new and results are a combination of the previous two cases. 
We support the analysis above by evaluating the "perspective vs existing" voting premium looking at 
the voting outcome, netting out the effect of distance. To do so we split the sample according to 10 
kilometers intervals of distance at which each municipality is from the closest nuclear plant and set a 
dummy equal to one (zero) when the closest nuclear plant is a prospective (existing) one. We then run 
a regression for each subsample (i.e. municipalities between 0 and 10 kilometers, 10 and 20 
kilometers and so on, from the closest nuclear plant) where the dependent variable is yese, control 
variables are those of Column 6 in Table 4, excluding regional dummies and distdif, while the key 
explanatory variable is the dummy equal to one if the closest municipality is a perspective plant. In 
Figure 3 we report the values that the coefficient of the dummy takes for each regression, together 
with the 95% confidence band. Results are consistent with the findings illustrated above and with 
literature on risk perception reported: Municipalities whose closer nuclear plant is a prospective one, 
irrespectively of the distance and controlling for other observables, vote more against nuclear power, 
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and the difference is significant in all those municipalities within a 100 kilometers radius from the 
closest plant.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of coefficients of the dummy for prospective 
vs existing plant of different distance bins.  
 
 
We have shown that voting behavior in the surroundings of new or prospective nuclear sites is 
different, so in the next series of regressions we keep the sample as homogeneous as possible in terms 
of risk feeling. Regressions are performed restricting the sample to those municipalities that would 
have experienced an increase in nuclear risk if the referendum succeed, i.e., those for which distdif is 
positive. The specification reported in Column 1 of Table 6 mimics our baseline specification (i.e. 
Column 6 of Table 4) on the restricted sample and the coefficient of distdif does not change 
significantly. This result backs indirectly our hypothesis that voting pattern in municipalities (in case 
in which distdif is equal to zero) should not be affected by the proposed policy. Being distdif positive, 
we can take its log and evaluate whether the effect of distdif is decreasing in distdif itself. As reported 
in Column 2, the coefficient is less precisely estimated (5% level, with the linear specification it was 
1%), while if we take the exponential of distdif, the coefficient is positive and more precisely estimated 
suggesting an increasing effect of distdif in distdif itself. An explanation for this result is that not only 
risk is increasing with the approaching of nuclear plants, but indirectly even the awareness and the 
experience of the risk itself increase. Thus, kindly interpreted, general risk perception, for any given 
level of risk, is increasing with distdif. Column 4 treats this issue using dummies that flag medium 
(100< distdif <300) and large (distdif >300) approaches of nuclear plants. The coefficients of both 
dummies are positive and significant, where in particular the latter is three times larger than the 
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former. We then look at the raw distance from the prospective nuclear plants again in the subsample 
of municipalities where distdif is positive. As expected the coefficient on distance (Column 5) is 
negative but weakly significant, while taking the log of distance (Column 6) the coefficient is more 
precisely estimated suggesting a decreasing marginal disutility from living close to nuclear facilities. It 
is worth stressing here some differences in the estimated coefficients of the other variables stemming 
from the exclusion of municipalities for which distdif is equal to zero. The coefficient of owners is no 
more significant indicating a sort of short sightedness of homeowners, since it turns out that they only 
react to the presence of existing plants. On the contrary, maybe constructors and real estate people are 
more farsighted and they perceive a potential decrease in buildings' value, their coefficients (constr 
and real, respectively) being now positive and significant.  
In the next set of regressions, we restrict the analysis to Sicilia and Sardinia (the two largest Italian 
islands) where in each of the two the proposed policy would have located a new nuclear plant. Since 
the two islands are not currently hosting any nuclear facility, this analysis turns out to be more easily 
comparable with other studies regarding the location of hazardous facilities, as for example (Groothuis 
and Miller, 1997). The natural explanatory variable in the regressions for Sicily (Sardinia) is the 
distance from the location of the prospective nuclear plant of Palma di Montechiaro (Oristano) 
coinciding with distnew. Results with the linear specification (Columns 1 and 4 of Table 7) deliver 
negative and strongly significant coefficients (with that of Sardinia twice as that of Sicily). With respect 
to the specification in Column 5 of Table 6, the more comparable specification with a larger sample, 
the coefficients of distnew are five and ten times larger for Sicilia and Sardinia, respectively. This 
suggests a higher distance-related risk perception in both regions. Results using the log of distnew 
(collected in Columns 2 and 5) are in line with those in the linear case. In Columns 3 and 6 we 
introduce dummies for different distance bins (distnew below 10 kilometers, between 10 and 20, 
between 20 and 30 and between 30 and 50) to evaluate more precisely the spatial pattern of voting 
behavior in the surroundings of prospective nuclear plants. For Sicily we get a pattern in which it 
seems that only municipalities in the close vicinity (<10 km) of the prospected nuclear plant voted 
significantly above the average (3.7% more, in particular), while for Sardinia the spatial pattern is 
clearer, i.e., it is consistent with diminishing rates between yes-votes and the distance from Oristano. 
The spatial patters of vote for Sicily and Sardinia are plotted in Figure 3. With respect to Sicily among 
the other variables used in the regressions only few ones remain significant. In particular construction 
is positive and strongly significant as in the case of the restriction to positive distdif above, together 
with the variables related to unionization: edu, manuf and public are positive and significant. As in all 
other specifications, the variables from political elections in 2008 are very significant, while 
surprisingly google has a negative coefficient. For Sardinia, only the variables from political elections 
in 2008 are significant, together with google that turns positive as in the large majority of previous 
specifications. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We empirically analyzed the determinants of yes-votes cast in a referendum on the building and 
restoration of nuclear facilities in Italy. Several investigation patterns could be profiled. In particular 
we model the municipality voting decision in such a way that the correlation between yes votes and 
proximity to the proposed or existing plants can be interpreted as evidence on risk perception. A 
measure of distance was introduced allowing us to address the question of whether or not risk 
preferences might be reversed in different impact of distances between old and new facilities. In this 
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case votes for and against the proposal might be even a function determined by different risk 
perceptions of existing or proposed plants. We further recognize the possibility that opposition at the 
referendum might be related to factors like demographics, political leaning and other community 
attributes as representativeness of employment categories, unemployment rate, education, share of 
foreigners, homeowners and elderly population. Due to the nature of data and to the absence of a well-
defined compensation policy for the municipalities close to the potential nuclear plants (Coates et al., 
2006), we claim that our estimates do not suffer from severe biases. We find that a 1% increase in 
votes against nuclear power is achieved every 85 kilometers of approaching the closest nuclear plant. 
Political alignment of municipal and regional institutions plays a role in determining turnout, but still 
distance significantly matters even controlling for municipality attributes. Results are robust to the 
inclusion of regional fixed effects, as well as different specifications of distance. 
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Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
yese Share of yes among electors 8068 0.534 0.075 0.191 0.857 
turn Turnout 8068 0.567 0.074 0.209 0.871 
yesv Share of yes among voters 8068 0.941 0.030 0.524 1.000 
distdif Difference between old and new minimal distances 8092 0.073 0.104 0.000 0.451 
distall Distance from the closer nuclear plant among all the plants 8092 0.081 0.040 0.000 0.237 
distold Distance from the closer existing plant 8092 0.154 0.113 0.002 0.649 
distnew Distance from the closer prospective plant 8092 0.159 0.098 0.000 0.419 
distfor Distance from the closer foreign plant 8092 0.482 0.285 0.110 1.132 
over65 Share of elderly people (+65 years)  8101 0.213 0.065 0.057 0.643 
secondary Share of people with at least high-school 8101 0.273 0.064 0.053 0.721 
commuters Share of people commuting to another municipality for work  8101 0.543 0.176 0.000 1.000 
owners Share of people owning the house where they reside 8101 0.773 0.072 0.293 1.000 
foreign Share of foreign population 8101 0.049 0.037 0.000 0.271 
unemp Unemployment rate 8101 0.101 0.088 0.000 0.513 
logpop Log of population in 2011 8068 7.851 1.338 3.526 14.831 
agri Share of workforce in agriculture 8101 0.099 0.091 0.000 0.683 
public Share of workforce in public administration 8101 0.076 0.050 0.000 0.555 
constr Share of workforce in construction 8101 0.105 0.045 0.000 0.506 
manuf Share of workforce in manufacturing 8101 0.255 0.128 0.000 0.738 
hotel Share of workforce in hotels and restaurants 8101 0.051 0.040 0.000 0.600 
comm Share of workforce in commerce 8101 0.129 0.035 0.000 0.340 
health Share of workforce in health 8101 0.061 0.027 0.000 0.596 
real Share of workforce in real estate 8101 0.044 0.020 0.000 0.193 
edu Share of workforce in education (schools and universities) 8101 0.061 0.033 0.000 0.313 
energy Share of workforce in energy 8101 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.215 
polturn Turnout at 2008 political elections 7903 0.812 0.063 0.178 0.980 
polright Vote share of the two main center-right parties at 2008 
elections 
7904 0.485 0.129 0.012 0.870 
google Google Index for "nucleare" search, mar-jun 2011 (province 
level) 
8092 0.245 0.188 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
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turn .98 
                          yesv .36 .15 
                         distdif .12 .02 .49 
                        distall .02 -.03 .21 .07 
                       distold .12 .01 .52 .93 .43 
                      distnew -.14 -.04 -.46 -.53 .09 -.45 
                     distfor -.05 -.20 .63 .60 .24 .63 -.61 
                    over65 -.01 .00 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.10 .09 -.05 
                   secondary .15 .17 -.06 -.13 -.03 -.13 .02 -.07 -.21 
                  commuters .09 .18 -.39 -.38 -.18 -.41 .39 -.52 .08 .01 
                 owners .09 .09 .03 .18 -.01 .16 -.19 -.02 .31 -.28 .19 
                foreign .00 .08 -.36 -.31 -.11 -.32 .10 -.43 -.06 .17 .11 -.20 
               unemp -.13 -.26 .55 .51 .15 .52 -.35 .77 -.12 -.15 -.41 -.12 -.49 
              logpop .07 .04 .20 .17 -.03 .14 -.26 .21 -.55 .38 -.50 -.40 .13 .16 
             agri -.12 -.18 .23 .21 .10 .23 -.09 .32 .29 -.42 -.24 .16 -.18 .24 -.29 
            public .06 -.04 .47 .41 .15 .42 -.37 .60 .17 .01 -.26 .05 -.41 .62 -.05 .11 
           constr -.18 -.18 -.06 -.02 .13 .03 -.02 .01 .03 -.34 .04 .22 -.13 .07 -.25 -.04 .01 
          manuf .06 .16 -.42 -.33 -.27 -.39 .20 -.49 -.18 -.02 .34 -.04 .40 -.55 .08 -.43 -.63 -.21 
         hotel -.03 -.03 -.01 -.03 .23 .06 .00 -.10 .07 .03 -.08 .03 -.03 -.06 -.15 -.12 .03 .13 -.29 
        comm .02 .03 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.03 .05 -.06 -.21 .35 -.02 -.23 .06 .01 .37 -.33 -.05 -.17 -.15 .07 
       health .09 .08 .07 .00 .05 .02 .03 .01 .00 .31 .02 -.10 -.07 .06 .13 -.20 .12 -.09 -.20 -.08 .09 
      real .07 .12 -.17 -.21 -.09 -.22 .23 -.25 -.17 .60 .15 -.20 .13 -.18 .30 -.40 -.13 -.22 .02 .00 .35 .18 
     edu .07 -.02 .46 .36 .20 .40 -.27 .59 -.08 .26 -.35 -.10 -.34 .57 .22 .06 .50 -.08 -.48 -.10 -.01 .22 .01 
    energy .08 .09 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .04 -.03 .08 .05 .01 .04 -.09 .02 -.06 -.07 .11 .04 -.14 .04 -.02 .06 -.01 .02 
   polturn .17 .26 -.38 -.39 -.11 -.39 .11 -.41 -.26 .20 .27 -.09 .39 -.51 .11 -.27 -.40 -.09 .42 -.05 .10 -.03 .17 -.30 -.04 
  polright -.61 -.52 -.53 -.24 -.14 -.26 .31 -.29 -.18 -.03 .18 -.10 .15 -.14 -.05 -.12 -.27 .14 .21 -.01 .08 -.08 .06 -.27 -.08 .17 
 google .12 .13 -.04 .06 -.11 .01 .02 -.22 -.02 -.05 .10 .08 .08 -.12 -.03 -.02 -.14 -.05 .10 .00 .04 .02 .02 -.14 -.06 .07 -.01 
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                            Table 3. Pairwise correlations. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable yese yese yese yese yese yese turn yesv 
distdif 0.096*** 0.217*** 0.184*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.118*** 0.121*** -0.000 
 [0.008] [0.021] [0.020] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.005] 
over65 
  
-0.097*** -0.146*** -0.153*** -0.148*** -0.140*** -0.030*** 
   
[0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.007] 
secondary 
  
0.026 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.090*** -0.025*** 
   
[0.021] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.007] 
commuters 
  
0.087*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.008*** 
   
[0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] 
owners 
  
0.022 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.011** 
   
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.005] 
foreigners 
  
-0.162*** -0.064*** -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.016* 
   
[0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.009] 
unemp 
  
-0.162*** -0.042** -0.044** -0.043** -0.048** 0.009* 
   
[0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.005] 
logpop 
  
0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003*** 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
agri 
  
0.014 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.012 0.020** 
   
[0.031] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.010] 
public 
  
0.144*** 0.112*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.014 
   
[0.043] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.014] 
constr 
  
-0.145*** 0.019 0.026 0.026 0.029 -0.016 
   
[0.037] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.012] 
manuf 
  
0.099*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.010 
   
[0.029] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.010] 
hotel 
  
-0.067 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.026 0.037*** 
   
[0.041] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.013] 
comm 
  
-0.067 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.018 0.021 
   
[0.043] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.014] 
health 
  
0.158*** 0.104*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.078** 0.041*** 
   
[0.041] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.033] [0.014] 
real 
  
0.109* 0.066 0.066 0.057 0.064 -0.003 
   
[0.062] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.025] 
edu 
  
0.379*** 0.184*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.177*** 0.028** 
   
[0.046] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.014] 
energy 
  
0.621*** 0.310*** 0.340*** 0.332*** 0.357*** 0.010 
   
[0.095] [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.080] [0.032] 
polturn 
   
0.251*** 0.243*** 0.246*** 0.269*** -0.020*** 
    
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.005] 
polright 
   
-0.375*** -0.377*** -0.378*** -0.357*** -0.070*** 
    
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] 
google 
    
0.026*** 0.026*** 0.028*** -0.000 
     
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] 
distfor 
     
-0.041*** -0.049*** 0.016*** 
      
[0.014] [0.014] [0.005] 
FE NO REG REG REG REG REG REG REG 
Observations 8,068 8,068 7,791 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 
Adjusted R-squared 0.018 0.248 0.398 0.599 0.602 0.602 0.589 0.637 
 
         Table 4. OLS results. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable yese yese yese yese yese yese 
distold<10 0.005 
     
 
[0.008] 
     distold<30 
 
-0.012*** 
    
  
[0.002] 
    distnew<10 
  
0.031*** 
   
   
[0.004] 
   distnew<30 
   
0.013*** 
  
    
[0.003] 
  distall<10 
    
0.019*** 
 
     
[0.005] 
 distall<30 
     
-0.001 
      
[0.002] 
over65 -0.161*** -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
secondary 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
commuters 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
owners 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
foreigners -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.065*** 
 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
unemp -0.045** -0.041** -0.045** -0.046** -0.045** -0.045** 
 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
logpop 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
agri 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 
 
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] 
public 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 
 
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
constr 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.025 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
manuf 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 
 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
hotel 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
comm 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
health 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 
 
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
real 0.064 0.053 0.064 0.065 0.067 0.062 
 
[0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] 
edu 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
 
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] 
energy 0.346*** 0.349*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.343*** 0.347*** 
 
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.073] [0.074] [0.074] 
polturn 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 
 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
polright -0.381*** -0.380*** -0.381*** -0.380*** -0.381*** -0.381*** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
google 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
distfor -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
FE REG REG REG REG REG REG 
Observations 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.600 0.600 
              
           Table 5. OLS results. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable yese yese yese yese yese yese 
distdif 0.105*** 
   
  
 
[0.021] 
   
  
log(distdif) 
 
0.002** 
  
  
  
[0.001] 
  
  
exp(distdif) 
  
0.089*** 
 
  
   
[0.018] 
 
  
100<distdif<300 
   
0.010***   
    
[0.002]   
distdif>300 
   
0.030***   
    
[0.006]   
distnew 
    
-0.047*  
     
[0.025]  
log(distnew) 
    
 -0.005*** 
     
 [0.001] 
over65 -0.067** -0.077*** -0.066** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.075*** 
 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
secondary 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 
 
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] 
commuters 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
owners 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.009 0.017 0.017 
 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] 
foreigners -0.078*** -0.068** -0.079*** -0.087*** -0.068** -0.065** 
 
[0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
unemp -0.041* -0.041* -0.042* -0.045* -0.043* -0.044* 
 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
logpop 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
agri 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033 
 
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
public 0.069 0.075* 0.069 0.071 0.077* 0.081* 
 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
constr 0.093** 0.086** 0.095** 0.093** 0.090** 0.097** 
 
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] 
manuf 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
hotel -0.077* -0.083** -0.075* -0.077* -0.071* -0.068* 
 
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] 
comm 0.082* 0.088* 0.082* 0.087* 0.092** 0.094** 
 
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] 
health 0.103** 0.099** 0.103** 0.102** 0.103** 0.108** 
 
[0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] 
real 0.184** 0.180** 0.184** 0.178** 0.175** 0.177** 
 
[0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] 
edu 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 
 
[0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] 
energy 0.160 0.188 0.162 0.175 0.189 0.184 
 
[0.118] [0.118] [0.118] [0.119] [0.118] [0.117] 
polturn 0.216*** 0.208*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 
 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] 
polright -0.364*** -0.368*** -0.364*** -0.367*** -0.369*** -0.368*** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
google 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
distfor 0.019 0.059*** 0.019 0.039* 0.075*** 0.070*** 
 
[0.022] [0.020] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] 
FE REG REG REG REG REG REG 
Observations 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923 
Adjusted R-squared 0.622 0.620 0.622 0.623 0.620 0.621 
     
  
Table 6. OLS results. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable yese yese yese yese yese yese 
Region Sicily Sicily Sicily Sardinia Sardinia Sardinia 
distnew -0.265*** 
  
-0.568*** 
  
 
[0.090] 
  
[0.148] 
  logdistnew 
 
-0.014*** 
  
-0.021*** 
 
  
[0.005] 
  
[0.006] 
 distnew<10 
  
0.037** 
  
0.056*** 
   
[0.015] 
  
[0.016] 
10<distnew<20 
  
0.047 
  
0.066*** 
   
[0.040] 
  
[0.013] 
20<distnew<30 
  
0.001 
  
0.036** 
   
[0.017] 
  
[0.015] 
30<distnew<50 
  
0.016 
  
0.031** 
   
[0.013] 
  
[0.013] 
over65 0.027 0.018 -0.001 -0.068 -0.031 -0.009 
 
[0.104] [0.105] [0.107] [0.115] [0.116] [0.119] 
secondary 0.082 0.063 0.037 0.106 0.090 0.105 
 
[0.099] [0.098] [0.099] [0.089] [0.089] [0.087] 
commuters 0.012 0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003 
 
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] 
owners -0.121* -0.117* -0.110* 0.027 0.030 -0.010 
 
[0.063] [0.064] [0.065] [0.089] [0.091] [0.091] 
foreigners -0.251 -0.253 -0.246 0.597* 0.563 0.523 
 
[0.222] [0.228] [0.231] [0.347] [0.348] [0.348] 
unemp -0.100 -0.106* -0.112* -0.003 -0.002 0.004 
 
[0.062] [0.062] [0.064] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] 
logpop 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 
 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
agri 0.185* 0.199* 0.215* -0.039 -0.023 -0.054 
 
[0.106] [0.107] [0.110] [0.106] [0.107] [0.109] 
public 0.229 0.257* 0.285* -0.055 -0.027 -0.043 
 
[0.143] [0.144] [0.145] [0.137] [0.138] [0.139] 
constr 0.503*** 0.511*** 0.514*** 0.069 0.083 0.080 
 
[0.140] [0.141] [0.146] [0.143] [0.145] [0.145] 
manuf 0.292** 0.313** 0.332** 0.121 0.163 0.121 
 
[0.135] [0.136] [0.137] [0.122] [0.124] [0.123] 
hotel 0.075 0.082 0.095 -0.195 -0.230 -0.271* 
 
[0.152] [0.152] [0.155] [0.144] [0.140] [0.138] 
comm 0.114 0.131 0.158 0.178 0.213 0.148 
 
[0.165] [0.166] [0.171] [0.150] [0.152] [0.154] 
health 0.345** 0.382** 0.414** -0.154 -0.101 -0.135 
 
[0.169] [0.167] [0.167] [0.166] [0.169] [0.171] 
real 0.145 0.153 0.196 0.510** 0.479* 0.380 
 
[0.323] [0.326] [0.334] [0.254] [0.255] [0.265] 
edu 0.336** 0.362** 0.398** 0.122 0.145 0.111 
 
[0.151] [0.153] [0.156] [0.170] [0.172] [0.168] 
energy 0.640 0.610 0.617 -0.210 -0.187 -0.186 
 
[0.552] [0.539] [0.532] [0.350] [0.353] [0.334] 
polturn 0.480*** 0.486*** 0.475*** 0.307*** 0.308*** 0.327*** 
 
[0.095] [0.097] [0.097] [0.089] [0.089] [0.088] 
polright -0.314*** -0.331*** -0.347*** -0.282*** -0.295*** -0.312*** 
 
[0.038] [0.037] [0.038] [0.042] [0.043] [0.046] 
google -0.114*** -0.098*** -0.085** 0.033** 0.035** 0.028* 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
distfor 0.279*** 0.275*** 0.272*** 0.062 0.105 0.123 
 
[0.070] [0.071] [0.072] [0.075] [0.074] [0.080] 
Observations 389 389 389 254 254 254 
Adjusted R-squared 0.406 0.403 0.397 0.335 0.331 0.349 
 Table 7. OLS results. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 4. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of coefficients of distance 
bins in Sardinia and Sicily. 
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Appendix A - Transfers 
In this Appendix we test whether we can find track of higher transfers (i.e., compensations) from the 
central government to municipalities close to the nuclear facilities that the government planned in 
2009 to build by 2013. The referendum in 1987 abolished official compensations to municipalities 
hosting (and in the vicinity of) nuclear facilities. However different forms of compensations arose in 
the subsequent years through a series of laws and regulations whose detailed analysis is beyond the 
scope of this work. Thus although a referendum abolished compensations, it is still possible for the 
central government to discretionary transfer funds to municipalities in order to "buy" political support 
for new facilities or to compensate for existing (and likely to be re-activated) ones. This can be done 
using a variety of policy instruments, for instance the so called "Thousand Prorogations", a law voted 
between Christmas and New Year’s Eve in which parliamentarians use to allocate central 
government's funds, usually toward their electoral district, at their own wish. 
To tackle this issue we construct a simple Difference in Difference framework, thus we regress the per 
capita transfers (in euro) from the central government to municipalities in 2007 and 2008 (or 2009) 
against municipality fixed effects, a dummy for year 2008 (or 2009) and the same dummy interacted 
with a measure of municipal vicinity to nuclear plants, which is our treatment. Municipal vicinity takes 
value one when the center of the municipality is within a distance of 10 or 50 kilometers from the 
closer (existing or all) nuclear facility. Numbers of treated municipalities is not so small, especially in 
the case of 50 kilometers radius: there are 33 (72) municipalities within 10 kilometers from old (all) 
nuclear facilities and 1097 (1810) municipalities within 10 kilometers from old (all) ones. As baseline 
case, we use transfers in 2007 since the central government was at that time led by a center-left 
coalition opposed to nuclear power. Then elections came in 2008 and a center-right coalition (having 
nuclear power in its policy agenda) got the majority, so that rumors of new nuclear facilities began to 
spread, crystallizing in the document by the Green Party (discussed in the core of the paper). We use 
as treatment year either the 2008 or 2009 with a trade-off between having closer time periods (2008 
instead of 2009) and having a possibly sharper effect (policies in 2008 may still be mainly focused on 
key issues of the winning coalition's political platform announced during the campaign, which nuclear 
was not part). In Table A1 we report the results for our Difference in Difference estimation. All the 
specifications show that municipalities in the vicinity of existing or all nuclear facilities did not enjoy 
an increase in transfers from central government after the decision to set up nuclear facilities has been 
taken.  
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
distold<10 * 2008 -12.51 
       
 
[28.03] 
       
distold<50 * 2008 
 
-16.34 
      
  
[31.60] 
      
distall<10 * 2008 
  
-18.18 
     
   
[27.80] 
     
distall<50 * 2008 
   
-20.59 
    
    
[35.41] 
    
distold<10 * 2009 
    
-1.06 
   
     
[33.22] 
   
distold<50 * 2009 
     
-17.58 
  
      
[31.87] 
  
distall<10 * 2009 
      
-13.48 
 
       
[29.18] 
 
distall<50 * 2009 
       
-28.95 
        
[35.65] 
2008 or 2009 
dummy 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15500 15500 15500 15500 15382 15382 15382 15382 
Within R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         Table A1. Results for OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B (1987 vs 2011 Italian nuclear referendum) 
 
Contrary to all results obtained in 2011 referendum, here, we investigate the voting pattern in the 
Italian nuclear referendum in 1987. Results did not show a clear trend in terms of distance from 
nuclear facilities and voting behavior. This suggests that while in 1987 there was an overall increase in 
the aversion toward nuclear energy for its widespread dangerous effect in case of accidents; instead in 
2011 the consequences of the Fukushima accident support the hypothesis that the distance-related 
risk component associated to a localized nuclear disaster does play a role in voters' behavior.  
The relevant events around both referenda occurred following similar patterns. The Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster happened in April 1986, its effects being felt across the whole Europe. Few months 
later, a referendum about nuclear power has been set up to take place in November 1987. Similar to 
the 2011 case, the two specific questions in the referendum asked (i) whether to impede the central 
government to decide where to set up new nuclear plants and (ii) whether to eliminate monetary 
compensations to municipalities hosting nuclear plants.  
In June 2011 the referendum took place three months after the Fukushima nuclear accident and was a 
response to the government's intention to return to nuclear power declared since 2009. 
In the Fukushima case, contrary to the Chernobyl one, there was not widespread direct negative 
impact on Italian population (no problems of contamination from rain, for instance) and then, the 
detailed coverage that the disaster received in the mass-media conveyed the message that the danger 
associated to nuclear disasters was a localized phenomenon, rather than a widespread one. 
To support this view, we compare the results of 1987 referendum with those of 2011 referendum. We 
test (by means of OLS regressions) whether the distance from (existing) nuclear facilities has a role in 
determining the province-level results both in 1987 and 2011. We aggregate data on the 2011 
referendum in order to have the same level of analysis. In particular, 1987 data are relative to the 95 
provinces, so we aggregate 2011 municipality-level data and construct a provincial-level distance to 
nuclear facilities as the average of variables capturing distances while exploiting the size of electorate 
in each municipality as weights.  
For the 1987 referendum the only distance we use is distold, since at that time there was not any 
short-term plan to set up new facilities in defined sites. Instead for 2011, we use distdif (our main 
explanatory variable) or distnew. As dependent variables we use the share of yes-voters and the 
turnout rate, since the preferred choice for those backing the no-option was to avoid showing up at the 
ballot. Our results are collected in Table A2. Given the limited number of observations we only control 
for regional fixed effects (19 dummies) and the log of population in 1991, the closest census 
observation for 1987 referendum. 
Columns 1 and 2 show that distances from existing nuclear facilities have no role in the outcome of 
1987 referendum as concerns the possibility for the central government to decide upon the location of 
new nuclear plants. Column 3 refers to the abolition of compensations to municipalities hosting 
existing nuclear facilities. In this case we do not find any role for distance. Column 4 and 5 replicate the 
last two specifications in terms of turnout and results are unchanged. Columns 6 and 7 refer to results 
of 2011 referendum showing that even at this level of aggregation, distdif plays a role, i.e. the closer 
becomes nuclear risk and more provinces are likely to vote against nuclear power. The pattern of 
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turnout is the same as that of yes-votes, as Column 8 shows. In the spirit of mimicking 1987 
specifications in terms of comparable measures of distance, in specification 9 we use distnew and its 
coefficient is, as expected, negative and significant at 5% level, with a magnitude that is not 
surprisingly similar, in absolute value, of that obtained in the three previous columns. 
 
 
 
  1987 referendum 2011 referendum 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES yes(i) yes(i) yes(ii) turnout(i) turnout(ii) yes yes turnout yes 
constant 0.505*** 0.467*** 0.451*** 0.747*** 0.746*** 0.615*** 0.494*** 0.531*** 0.545*** 
 
[0.040] [0.062] [0.062] [0.069] [0.070] [0.022] [0.035] [0.034] [0.037] 
distold 0.057 0.075 0.069 -0.009 -0.008 
    
 
[0.153] [0.143] [0.144] [0.167] [0.167] 
    
distdif 
     
0.275*** 0.287*** 0.272*** 
 
      
[0.073] [0.075] [0.074] 
 
distnew 
        
-0.282** 
         
[0.113] 
log(pop) 
 
0.006 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 
0.005 0.004 0.004 
  
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Adjusted R-squared 0.663 0.664 0.658 0.703 0.704 0.604 0.610 0.644 0.581 
          Table B1. Results for OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
